Is acting prosocially beneficial for the credit market? by Andriani, Luca
  
Working Papers in Management 
Birkbeck, Department of Management 
BWPMA 1304 
 
Is Acting Prosocially Beneficial for the 
Credit Market? 
 
 
Luca Andriani 
Department of Management 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
 
June 2013 
 
ISSN 2052 – 0581 
 
 
Birkbeck University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HX 
  
 Is Acting Prosocially Beneficial for the Credit 
Market?* 
 
Luca Andriani** 
Department of Management – Birkbeck College University of London – London, Malet 
Street WC1E 7HX 
 
June 2013 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This article argues that behaving prosocially implies more transparent information during the 
negotiation process of a financial contract and more cooperation among the parties to respect 
the terms of the contract. For this reason this work considers interest rate on loans and 
insolvency rate functions of prosocial behaviour along with the traditional socio-economic 
and financial collaterals. The context of study is Italy and the analysis is developed at a cross-
regional level. We collect data from the two reports on “Relatives and Safety Net” produced 
by the Italian Centre Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) in 1998 and 2003 and from the reports on 
“Regional Economics” produced by the Bank of Italy in the same years. A two-period panel 
model shows two interesting outcomes. Firstly, regions with a higher proportion of prosocial 
individuals report lower interest rates on loans and insolvency rates. Secondly, when we 
include the efficiency of legal enforcement, evidence supports the idea that a more efficient 
legal framework can act as a more reliable transmission mechanism of institutional norms 
and facilitate the internalisation of social norms.   
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 1. Introduction 
 
Prosocial individuals tend to assume a cooperative behaviour and to maximise the joint 
outcome even when this implies to incur in personal costs (Bogaert, Boone and Declerck 
2008). This work aims to test whether contexts populated by more prosocial individuals 
experience less credit market imperfections in the sense of lower bank interest rates for 
lending to residents and lower insolvency rates. The context of study is Italy and the analysis 
is developed at a cross-regional level. 
Italy represents an interesting case study due to differences existing among the Italian regions 
in terms of features of social organisations such as trust and social norms (Putnam; 1993). 
According to Putnam, this regional heterogeneity should be attributed to different historical 
institutional patterns that the regions experienced the country unification in 1861. One of the 
most peculiar issues is that these cross-regional differences seem to be still present nowadays, 
even though all the regions are subject to the same formal institutions such as rules of law, 
constitution, civil and criminal codes.  
Given this framework, it seems quite plausible to believe that the cross-regional 
heterogeneity can better capture the impact of the cooperative nature of the individuals on the 
credit market. 
Credit market imperfections are characterised by asymmetric information between the lender 
and the borrower about the validity of a project to be financed. The conventional scenario is 
that the borrower has more information on the quality and the riskiness of the project, which 
he/she is not always willing to share with the lender. This occurs especially during the 
negotiation of the terms of the financial contract. This omitted information might reveal the 
effective riskiness of the project or the effective ability of the borrower to repay the fund. In 
both of the cases, this drives the lender to solve an adverse selection problem (i.e., to avoid 
the selection of individuals that propose bad quality and risky projects) or decide to ascertain 
the quality and riskiness of the project. However, this implies higher monitoring costs and, 
hence, requires a higher return to compensate the lender from the additional costs. These 
conditions of uncertainty lead the lender to increase the interest rate of the loan (Hubbard 
1998).   
Once the contract is stipulated, even though the lender has managed to minimise the risk of 
adverse selection, he is still uncertain about the behaviour of the borrower in managing the 
loan. The lender would prefer that the borrower put high efforts to maximise the likelihood of 
success. However, for the borrower the high effort might be too costly and likely to be hidden 
to the lender. So moral hazard problems might arise when the borrower decides to put low 
efforts, increase the probability of failure and transfer the cost of failure to the lender by not 
repaying the loan. To minimise this eventuality, economic and financial collaterals are 
requested. However, even under these conditions financial contracts are broken with different 
frequencies in different contexts or countries. 
We argue that prosocial behaviour implies more transparent information during the 
negotiation process of a financial contract and more cooperation among the parties to respect 
the terms of the contract. Financial contracts can be considered as an exchange of financial 
resources today, such as money, for a promise to return more financial resources tomorrow. 
Since prosocials are individuals cooperating for the collective gain, they are more willing to 
avoid situations that could lower the capacity to fulfil a promise. Therefore, prosocials are 
more reluctant to engage in a credit contract if not enough collateralised (Pirinsky 2012). This 
precondition of reliable but also “reluctant” borrowers expects to reduce adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems and, hence, to have a positive effect in the arrangement of the 
financial contract. Under a more aggregate view, this implies that contexts with more 
prosocials are more likely to report lower interest rates on loans and lower insolvency rates.   
There is an emerging and growing literature showing that individuals do not behave only on 
the basis of their personal interest but also for the benefit of the collective wealth (Boagert et 
al. 2008; Torgler 2005). This evidence has particularly been reported in experimental and lab 
works (Andreoni 1995; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Bowles and Gintis 2002; Sobel 
2005). However, to our knowledge there is a limited number of empirical works attempting to 
associate social attitude with credit market performance.  
Ferray (2002) conducts a qualitative analysis about the financing of “Parisian brasseries” by 
the Parisian banks. He argues that “asocial” scientific methods of risk evaluation and 
institutional device applied by bankers are insufficient to efficiently reduce the risk related to 
their lending activities. When a financial counsellor belongs to a social network, he is able to 
add extra information about potential customers. This allows the lender to use what Ferray 
(2002) calls a method of social risk evaluation based on the acquisition of the information 
through the informal relationships the counsellor holds with the rest of the community. This 
method of course does not substitute the institutional one but it helps the banker in the 
lending decision process. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), instead, investigate the effect 
of social capital on financial development in Italy. By using outcome-based social capital 
indices such as electoral participation and blood donation they find that in areas with a higher 
level of social capital families are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more in 
stock, and have higher access to credit. Hong Kubik and Stein. (2004) analyses the link 
between social interaction and stock market participation in the US society. By dividing the 
investors into two types, “non-social” and “social”, they find that households that either know 
their neighbours or attend church have about a 4% higher probability of participating in the 
stock market than “non-social” households. A plausible explanation is that a social agent 
finds more attractive to participate in the market when more of his peers do.  
This article aims to provide an additional contribution in this direction by exploring for the 
first time the relationship between prosocial behaviour and credit market performance across 
the Italian regions. The exploratory nature of this work does not state on the empirical 
technique adopted, rather on the theoretical framework considered. It is very common to 
analyse credit market performance within the dominant perspective of the predetermined 
rational choice context where financial collateral and market uncertainty are the main driving 
factors of the financial contract success and failures. Without denying the importance of these 
factors, we stress on the point that the credit contract is embedded in a social exchange 
context where social and institutional norms play a crucial role. For this reason, prosocial 
behaviour and legal intervention are essential factors of our specified credit market function.         
The prosocial behaviour indicators adopted here are two:  the regional proportion of 
individuals actively involved in voluntary associations and the regional proportion of 
individuals that have provided economic help to family members and friends. These 
indicators are constructed by using secondary data from the reports on “Relatives and Safety 
Net” produced by the Italian Centre Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) in 1998 and 2003. There 
are, at least, two advantages in using these data. Firstly, they do not suffer of self-reported 
bias due to over-reported prosocial behaviour. Secondly, they allow this work to show 
interesting regional differences within the same country and help to speculate on potential 
policy recommendations.  
The credit market variables derive from the regional economic reports of the Bank of Italy 
and they refer to the same years of the ISTAT’s reports. The empirical analysis is developed 
through two different specifications and it uses a two-period panel model. In the first case, 
the specified empirical model considers the credit variables as functions of the prosocial 
variables along with economic and financial collaterals. In the second case, the model also 
includes the ability of legal enforcement. This allows the empirical framework to show two 
crucial issues: firstly to compare the impact of prosocial attitudes on the credit market 
variables with and without institutional intervention and detect any substitution effect 
between institutional and “social” enforcement; secondly to compare these empirical findings 
with experimental results on strong reciprocity produced by the literature and trace 
similarities and differences useful for further empirical and experimental research. 
The estimation framework provides evidence supporting the positive role of prosocial 
attitudes in reducing credit market imperfections with and without legal enforcement. In 
addition, when legal enforcement is included, it seems that the impact of prosocial behaviour 
is more effective under strong legal enforcement than under weak legal enforcement. This 
complementary effect between prosocial behaviour and legal enforcement drives to two 
interesting points of reflections. Firstly, it seems to confirm the mechanism of strong 
reciprocity tested in experimental works. Secondly, it provides evidence that a more efficient 
legal framework can act as a more reliable transmission mechanism of institutional norms 
and facilitate the internalisation of social norms.      
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 defines the concept of prosocial behaviour and 
presents the theoretical rationale on which the relationship between prossocial behaviour and 
credit market is established; section 3 describes the data, the prosocial and the credit market 
variables we consider in the specified empirical model; section 4 reports and discusses the 
empirical findings; section 5 provides and discusses the outcome of the robustness analysis; 
section 6 concludes 
 
 
2. Prosocial Behaviour and Credit Market   
 
2.1 Prosocial Behaviour and Cooperation for Collective Gain 
This paper is based on the assumption that everything we do in our life, any action, choice 
and outcome is conditioned somehow by the society in which we live. This is not a new 
assumption of course rather it is simply the framework within which the majority of social 
sciences work. 
Bowles and Gintis (2002) call this society community. A community is “a group of people 
who interact directly, frequently, and in multi-faceted ways” (Bowels and Gintis, 2002, p. 
420). Colleagues, neighbourhoods, groups of friends, professionals, business networks, gangs 
and sport leagues are just some examples of communities. The interactions and the 
relationships among the members of “this” community are the results of the members’ 
behaviours. Some of them tend to behave according to the interests of the community and 
others according to their own personal goal exclusively. The first type of individuals is called 
prosocial while the second type is called proself (Bogaert et al 2008). This non-homogeneous 
behaviour is at the basis of the social dilemma discourse which is about whether the 
individual decides to cooperate or not. If we think of the classical game of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, a prosocial player would try to maximise the joint outcome and, hence, reach the 
win-win solution. Proself players, instead, would try to maximise their own outcome and, 
hence, play defeat-defeat.  
Many scholars from different disciplines (social psychology, economics, sociology, political 
sciences and so on) have been studying this non-homogeneous behaviour in order to 
understand the reasons at the basis of a prosocially-orientated behaviour (or proself 
orientation of behaviour). One of the explanations broadly recognised especially in social 
psychology refers to the interdependence theory (Kelley and Thibaut 1978). This theory 
states that prosocial individuals are more willing to cooperate because they transform a give 
situation (i.e. matrix) into an effective matrix on the basis of their internalised norms (Bogaert 
et al. 2008). Hence, internalised norms are taken into account in the choice behaviour for 
solving social dilemma problems. This might also explain why prosocials tend to perceive the 
one-shot prisoner dilemma game as a coordination and not as a compete game as proselfs do 
(Simpson 2004). Prosocials are also more inclined to cooperate in situations of negotiations. 
Even though a negotiation does not necessarily imply a social dilemma, it involves an 
interaction which can easily create a situation of interdependence where one person can take 
advantage of the other (Bogaert et al. 2008). This is even more likely to occur under a 
condition of asymmetric information like in the case of the credit markets. For instance, if we 
consider the ultimatum bargaining game designed by Van Dijk, Cremer and Handgraaf 
(2004), two players negotiate under two different information conditions: a symmetric 
information condition where both of the players have the same access to information relative 
to the dilemma problem they should solve; an asymmetric information condition where one 
of the players has more access to the pertinent information. The outcome indicates that 
prosocials tend to cooperate in both conditions while proselfs cooperate only under the 
symmetric information condition due to the high probabilities of reaching a lower outcome in 
case of defect choice.  
Even though prosocials prefer cooperation to competition, they are conscious of the 
corresponding risks of exploitation from partners. Two crucial elements are likely to 
minimise this risk: cooperation under the condition of reciprocity and contextual information 
deriving from the social environment.  
The first element is a coping strategy adopted against free-riders and it is labelled in 
economics with the term “strong reciprocity” (Bowles and Gintis 2002). This indicates a 
behavioural propensity of an individual to cooperate conditionally on other group members’ 
cooperation. Prosocials will punish partners’ violations of social norms by interrupting the 
cooperation mechanism even if this might be so costly for the punisher that he/she ends up 
with an economic loss. By using public games, Fehr and Gintis (2007) find evidence of a 
relevant share of individuals exhibiting strong reciprocity. In their experiment, individuals 
involved in the same experiment behave as self-regarding and as cooperative according to 
whether in the experiment punishment is excluded or included. Consistent with the strong 
reciprocity mechanism, in the case of financial contracts, we might expect less cooperative 
behaviour in contexts where legal enforcement (punishment opportunity) is weaker. Indeed, 
empirical evidence shows that countries with poorer investor protection have smaller and less 
effective financial markets (La Porta et al. 1997). With respect to the Italian case, Magri 
(2006) reports that in provinces with weaker legal enforcement the negative impact of the 
asymmetric information is larger for lenders.      
The second element refers to contextual information deriving from the social environment. 
Signalling others’ trustworthiness can represent a crucial determinant of the cooperative 
behaviour of the prosocials (Bogaert et al. 2008). De Bruin and Van Lange (1999) and 
Smeester et al. (2003) show that information signalling moral and honest partners evoke more 
cooperation from everybody. For instance, in the game advanced by Kandory (1991) each 
agent carries a label (such as reputation, membership, citizenship, credit cards etc…) which 
transmits the necessary information. In this case, the community somehow “marks” deviators. 
Under the assumption that the social norm requires that an individual should not cooperate if 
the potential partner is labelled as a deviator, nobody has an incentive to deviate from the 
equilibrium path when the punishment is severe enough. This mechanism works, of course, 
reversely as well. In the case an individual is likely to deal with many deviators in the future, 
then, the punishment might be costly to carry out and this may destroy the incentive for them 
to cooperate. In simple words, when the information transmission depicts a community in 
which dishonest behaviours are likely to dominate, the tendency of respecting social norms is 
lower. Consistent with this view, in the case of financial contracts we might expect that 
contexts with a higher proportion of prosocials show also lower insolvency rates. This might 
be because social norms, such as to keep a promise to repay a loan, are more likely to be 
respected.  
 
 
2.2 Prosocial Behaviour and Credit Market: a Theoretical Rationale 
The causality diagram of figure 1 depicts the scenario of this research analysis. Let’s 
consider a financial contract between two parties: a lender and a borrower. The theoretical 
framework of the prosocial attitude implies more cooperation among the two parties in order 
to comply with the terms of the contract. Hence, the main hypothesis under investigation 
states that in contexts with more individuals acting prosocially, two main consequences 
should follow: firstly, borrowers should have access to lower interest rates; secondly, 
lenders should have to deal with lower insolvency rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 Causality diagram of prosocial behaviour and credit market                        
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The credit market variables we use to test the causality diagram are calculated by the Bank 
of Italy at the regional level (Banca d’Italia 1999, 2004) and they are: the average regional 
interest rate applied for lending to resident (rate) in 1998 and 2003 and the ratio between 
insolvency and lending (insol) in 1998 and 2003.  
The interest rate is not only an equilibrium price between credit supply and demand, but also  
a promise to pay an amount in the future (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2003). Unfortunately, 
“promises are often broken otherwise there would be no issue in determining credit 
worthiness” (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2003, p. 27). Actually, one of the factors that determine 
high rates is the high costs of screening loan applicants and pursuing delinquent borrowers 
(Stiglitz 1990). Considering that the bank is risk-neutral, it will set the interest rate on the 
distribution of clients between risk-averse and risk-lover. The risk-lover borrower is more 
likely to engage in moral hazard actions and imprudent behaviour at the cost of non-
maintaining the promised stipulated with the lender. On the contrary, the risk-averse 
borrower will adopt a prudent behaviour and minimise the risk of non-compliance condition. 
Hence, the risk-averse element, refers not only to a pure calculation about the return of the 
investment project but also to a “backwards” decision taken by the potential borrower in 
order to avoid the non-compliance condition. This can be due to expected social punishment 
(reputation severely damaged) or because of social norms in which the borrower believes. 
For instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2011) indicate that even during the current 
financial crisis more than 80% of the individuals consider a strategic default immoral and 
wrong. Under these conditions, if the bank receives signals from the pertinent environment 
about a large proportion of risk-averse individuals, the bank will set a lower interest in order 
to reduce the probability of attracting mainly risk-lover borrowers.  
In a pure descriptive market perspective the insolvency rate indicates the rate of failure in 
repaying a loan. If we consider the insolvency rate as a tendency of “non-compliance1”, a 
context with a larger proportion of prosocials should also record a lower rate of insolvency
2
. 
                                                          
1
 This does not necessarily mean a form of “cheating” post-contract. It might be the consequence of a form of 
cheating pre-contract. Borrowers might cheat on the riskiness of the project, or on their ability in the 
implementation of the project or simply on their initial willingness to repay the loan.    
2
 Of course this explanation is not completely exhaustive since a borrower can become insolvent due to different 
other reasons mainly related to changes in market conditions. Nevertheless, Fay et al. (2002) record that risk-
taking borrowers increase the probability of being insolvent or of facing bankruptcy than risk-averse individuals 
in US between 1984 and 1995.   
In a community with a higher level of cooperation and commitment, individuals “insolvent” 
might lose reputation not only with respect to the credit institute but also with respect to the 
rest of the community. In societies where the level of “dishonesty” is quite low, we might 
expect to find a lower insolvency rate too.  
    
 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
The main sources for the statistical and empirical analysis are regional data produced by the 
reports on “Relatives and Safety Net” of the Italian Centre Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) in 
1998 and 2003 and the regional economic reports of the Bank of Italy in the same period. The 
ISTAT report of 1998 is based on a sample of 21,153 households located in 816 counties 
(comuni). The ISTAT report of 2003 is based on a sample of 19,227 households located in 
787 counties (comuni). In order to minimise the estimation error, the counties are stratified on 
the basis of their demographic dimension and weighted at regional level. For each county, the 
households are randomly selected with equal probabilities
3
. This sampling procedure allows 
the ISTAT to aggregate the data at the regional level without affecting the statistical 
reliability of the estimates in a cross-regional analysis (ISTAT 2001, p. 99; 2006, p. 95). 
 
3.1 Prosocial Behaviour Variables 
As anticipated in the introduction, in our analysis we use two different indicators of prosocial 
behaviour: associational activity (vol) and informal economic help (econgive).  
The indicator vol is the regional proportion of individuals actively involved in charitable 
organisations as volunteer. These are the individuals that have positively answered to the 
question whether they have provided help as volunteer in the last 12 months. According to 
the literature (Irwin 2009; Berigan and Irwin 2011) the proportion of active members of 
charitable organisations represents a good indicator of aggregate prosocial attitude. Berigan et 
al. (2011) consider the memberships of voluntary associations an indicator of first-order 
cooperation indicating individuals willing to contribute directly to the collective effort and 
hence behaving prosocially (Irwin 2011). Without mentioning the term “prosocial”, in his 
seminal work on social capital in the Italian regions, Putnam (1993) argues that active 
members of voluntary associations cultivate a habit of cooperation, solidarity and public-
spiritendness. This implies a higher level of reciprocity and honesty.   
The indicator econgive is the regional proportion of individuals that have provided economic 
help to relatives and friends. The informal economic help provided to family and friends 
represents an important form of solidarity where the sense of reciprocity might have an 
important role. Fafchamps and Gubert (2005) and Udry (1994) identify in the inter-personal 
loan a form of risk-sharing. This occurs especially among individuals with less initial 
endowment and with a strong sense of community like in rural areas (Fafchamps 2003). 
                                                          
3
 For more details about the sample selection the report can be consulted at the ISTAT website at 
www.istat.it/societa/comportamenti 
Empirical evidence supporting this view is also reported in high income contexts. In fact, Cox 
and Rank (1992) show that in United States the inter-vivos transfers are strongly motivated 
by a sense of reciprocity. Uphoff (1999) points out that interpersonal relationships are held by 
mutual expectations of benefits and sustained by expectations of reciprocity. De Cremer and 
Van Lange (2001) find that prosocials are generally more concerned about the people that are 
in need and suffer. In their experiment, De Cremer and Van Lange (2001) report that, 
compared to self-interested individuals, prosocials feel more responsible to contribute to 
group interests and that they are “more likely to reciprocate their partner’s actions” (De 
Cremer and Van Lange 2001, p. S5).  
 According to the regional data from the ISTAT report, the proportion of families providing 
economic help to relatives and friends in the 1998 was distributed as follows: 3.46% in the 
North, 2.95% in the Centre and 3.02% in the South. In 2003 this distribution does not change 
tremendously even though the general proportion of help slightly increases in all the 
geographic areas (4.28% in the North, 3.95% in the Centre and 4.08% in the South).  
The correlation coefficient between the variables of prosocial behaviour is equal to 0.468 and 
it is statistically significant at 1% significant level. 
 
 
3.2 Prosocial Behaviour and Credit Market Variables 
The reports about the economic trend of the Italian regions published by the Bank of Italy 
(1999, 2004) depict a country whose credit market is not homogeneous across the regions. 
Table 1 shows the distributions of banks, in terms of agencies, across the country. 
 
  
Table 1 Distribution of Banks across Italy in 1998 and 2003 
 North Centre South 
% banks 1998 57.5 % 19.5 % 23 % 
% banks 2003 57.7 % 20.3 % 22 % 
Concentration of 
banks 1998 
0.113 0.083 0.047 
Concentration of 
banks 2003 
0.131 0.101 0.052 
Source: values elaborated from Bank of Italy (1999, 2004) 
 
Between the 1998 and the 2003 the total number of banks in Italy has increased in all the 
three geographical partitions. However, the northern regions host always more than 50% of 
the entire banking industry. Still in the North there is the highest concentration of banks 
(number of banks over hectares) even though the level of concentration is raised also in the 
Centre and in the South. This bank sector distribution is due to a higher level of 
industrialisation in northern regions relative to the rest of the country. Also the average 
interest rates set by the banks and applied for providing credit to what the Bank of Italy calls 
ordinary clients differ from one region to another. The interest rates charged in the Southern 
regions (in the histogram from Abruzzo to Sardegna) is generally higher with respect to the 
rest of the country (figure 2).  
  
Figure 2 Regional interest rates in Italy in 1998 and 2003 
 
 Source: Bank of Italy (1999; 2004) 
 
The direct consequence of a non-repayment solution is to be reported as insolvent. Figure 3 
indicates the ratio between insolvent credits and lending across the regions iduring the years 
1998 and 2003. The histogram shows that tis ratio decreases across the country from 1998 to 
2003. In 1998 most of the southern regions show a very high rate. Some of these regions 
such as Sicily and Abruzzo, improve dramatically between the two periods.  
 
Figure 3 Regional insolvency rates in Italy in 1998 and 2003 
 
Source: Bank of Italy (1999; 2004) 
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4. Estimation Framework and Empirical Findings  
 
We follow Magri (2006) and Guiso et al. (2004) and we model regional interest rate (rate) 
and regional insolvency rate (insol) as functions of prosocial behaviour (vol and econ_give), 
income in natural logs (lnincome), deposit (deposit) and the regional proportion of self-
employees over the total workers (self). Table 2 indicates the summary statistics and Table 
A1 (appendix) describes how the variables are calculated 
 
 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of the variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rate 40 7.551 1.719 4.660 11.070 
insol 39 9.041 7.152 1.900 33.200 
vol 40 1.922 1.051 0.310 4.750 
econgive 40 3.659 0.885 1.860 6.010 
lnincome 39 9.482 0.225 9.104 9.815 
deposit 40 0.562 0.129 0.062 0.864 
self 40 0.312 0.023 0.263 0.374 
 
 
The variables lnincome and deposit indicate economic and financial collaterals. Both provide 
the lender with information about the liquidity capacity of the potential borrower. The 
proportion of self-employees over total workers is an indicator of job stability. Being a self 
employee makes the income of the borrower less stable over the time and more subjected to 
fluctuations of the labour market performances. This might create more uncertainty in order 
to repay the loan and increase the level of opacity with respect to the lender. 
With respect to the interest rate, we expect that interest rates should decrease with prosocial 
behaviour. A community with a higher proportion of prosocials should have also a high 
proportion of risk-averse borrowers. This should induce the lender to set lower interest rates. 
Similarly, the interest rate should reduce with economic and financial collateral and increase 
with job instability.  
Our empirical findings are based on a two-period panel. Notice that we do not use a fixed 
effect estimator due to two crucial constraints related to our sample. The first constraint is 
characterised by the small sample size. The sample we use has a limited number of periods 
(time = 2) with only 20 observations for each period. With a two-period panel when t = 2 and 
N (number of observations) is not very large, the fixed effect estimator is the same of the first 
difference estimator. So the main difficulty is that the fixed effect estimator would become 
too sensitive to variations in models with low degrees of freedom and tends to capture mainly 
short rather than long run effects. 
The second constraint is characterised by the slowly-changing variables of interests of 
prosocial behaviour. The variables vol and econ_give changes quite substantially across 
regions but not tremendously across periods. By including slowly-changing variables in a 
two-period model, Wooldridge (2006, p. 475) warns that first difference estimators can be 
subject to serious biases. In fact, time-invariant as well as slowly changing variables would 
be highly correlated with the fixed effect (Wilson et al. 2007) and, hence, they will show a 
high standard error. Recalling Beck (2001) in Wilson (2007, p. 105) “if a variable changes 
over time, but slowly, the fixed effect will make it hard for such variable to appear either 
substantially or statistically significant... if an F-test indicates that fixed effects are required, 
then researchers should make sure they are not losing the explanatory power of slowly 
changing variables of interest”. The main consequence of losing the explanatory power of 
these variables would be a type II error where something that does matter is rejected (Wilson 
et al. 2007; Beck 2001).          
Table 3 shows the findings of the regression analysis. The first and the third columns are our 
basic specifications. They indicate the estimation of the prosocial behaviour on interest and 
insolvency rates.   
 
 
Table 3 interest rate, insolvency rate and prosocial behaviour* 
 (1) 
rate 
(2) 
rate 
(3) 
insol 
(4) 
insol 
vol -0.660*** 
(0.174) 
-0.502*** 
(0.0714) 
-2.978*** 
(0.519) 
-1.675*** 
(0.627) 
econgive -0.933*** 
(0.211) 
-0.472*** 
(0.136) 
-0.449 
(0.510) 
-0.158 
(0.511) 
lnincome  -4.269*** 
(0.415) 
 -21.00*** 
(4.644) 
deposit  -2.813*** 
(0.864) 
 -4.435 
(3.033) 
self  4.944 
(3.402) 
 -10.17 
(33.08) 
constant 12.23*** 
(0.575) 
50.74*** 
(4.247) 
16.52*** 
(2.805) 
217.9*** 
(44.81) 
N. 40 39 39 38 
R Squared 0.478 0.885 0.110 0.674 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parenthesis 
* In order to deal with heteroskedasticity and non-equicorrelated errors over time, we use cluster-robust 
covariance estimator as suggested in Schmidheiny (2012) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) 
 
 
 
In column 1 the prosocial indicators vol and econ_give are both negative and significant at 
1% statistical significant level with respect to the interest rate. Empirical evidence estimates 
that the interest rate reduces by 0.66% with a 1% increase in prosocial individuals (vol). 
When we consider people providing economic help, it appears that the interest rate reduces 
by about 0.9% with a 1% increase in econgive. Column 2 reports that the coefficient of 
prosocial behaviour variables is negative and significant when we add economic and financial 
collaterals, lnincome and deposit, and the job stability self. As expected, economic and 
financial collateral seem to play a crucial role in the set up of the interest rate. The regression 
2 shows that a 10% increase in income will reduce, on average, the interest rate by 0.43%, 
while an additional 1 million of euros in the deposit will reduce the interest rate by 2.81%.  
In Column 3 both of the prosocial variables are negatively related to the insolvency rate even 
though econ_give is not significant in this specification. Column 3 reports that the insolvency 
rate reduces by more than 2.9% with a 1% increase in active prosocial individuals (vol). This 
negative and significant relationship is still valid even when we include in the baseline 
specific model economic and financial collaterals like in column 4. This seems to confirm the 
initial hypothesis that prosocial behaviour might reduce the tendency of breaking the 
financial promise.  
  
 
4.1 Prosocial Behaviour, Legal Enforcement and Credit Market 
We extend the specified model to legal enforcement ability. Weak legal enforcement might 
drive the individuals to be less cooperative. So in a more realistic scenario, the decision of 
breaking or respecting the terms of a financial contract might also depend on the capacity of 
legal enforcement. We can reasonably expect that a stronger legal enforcement might work as 
a threat for the risk-lover borrowers since it increases the opportunities to be punished.  
Both empirical and experimental evidence reports higher level of compliance in contexts with 
stronger regulatory capacity. Fry and Torgler (2007) and Torgler (2004, 2005) report that 
citizens consider tax evasion more immoral than in contexts with a weaker rule of law in both 
high and low income countries. Given different probabilities of detection, experimental 
evidence shows that tax payers subject to low probability of detection tend to consider 
evasion less unethical than tax payers subject to high probability of detection (Blanthorne and 
Kaplam 2008). In a lab experiment, Fehr and Gintis (2007) show that under punishment 
opportunity strong reciprocity is more consistent and cooperative behaviour is internalised. 
The interesting point of this outcome is that also under non-punishment opportunity 
cooperation exists. However, the authors warn that this cooperation might stop in cases where 
cooperative values are not strong enough and free-riders keep on being unpunished. So under 
non-punishment condition if the proportion of free-riders increases then also cooperative 
individuals tend to stop cooperating. 
Within a credit market scenario, contexts with weak legal enforcement might face a higher 
concentration of risk-lovers with more opportunity to break the promise of the financial 
contract. In the analysis of long-term maturity debt and the supply of credit for the Italian 
firms, Magri (2006) argues that the quality of the legal system may affect the financial 
decision of the lender in supplying funds. Where the lender feels more protected by the 
juridical institutions the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard are reduced especially 
in the final stage of non-repayment of the borrower.   
To this purpose Italy represents an interesting case study. The different regions are subject 
to the same legal system and, with particular attention to the credit market, to the same 
bankruptcy code. However, it seems that the degree of legal enforcement varies across the 
regions (figure 4). Following Guiso et al. (2004), we use as indicator of legal enforcement 
(legal) the regional average length of time (number of days) to complete a first degree trial 
by the courts.  
Figure 4 shows that the length of time to complete a first degree trial by the courts differs 
quite significantly across the regions. In the 1998 in the North in order to complete the first 
degree trial it takes more than two years while in South it takes about four years. Between 
the 1998 and 2003 the country experiences a slightly average improvement even though 
variation across regions still occurs.  
On the basis of the literature (Guiso et al. 2004; Magri 2006; Omiccioli 2005) we consider a 
legal system to be less efficient when the average period is longer so when the coefficient of 
legal is higher. For instance, in regions where the length of time to complete the first degree 
trial is around four years, the legal enforcement is weaker than in regions where this period is 
reduced to two years.  
 
Figure 4 Legal enforcement in Italy 1998 and 2003 
 
Source: ISTAT 
 
Table 4 reports estimations of the prosocial behaviour and legal enforcement indicators on 
the regional insolvency rate. 
 
 
Table 4 Estimations of prosocial behaviour and legal enforcement on insolvency rate* 
 (1) 
insol 
(2) 
insol 
(3) 
Insol 
legal 0.0195*** 
(0.002) 
0.0158*** 
(0.002) 
0.0125*** 
(0.004) 
vol  -1.501*** 
(0.498) 
-1.310** 
(0.645) 
econgive  -0.280 
(0.580) 
-0.621 
(0.775) 
lnincome   -8.022 
(6.235) 
deposit   -2.986 
(4.198) 
self   -48.42* 
(26.17) 
constant -11.68*** 
(2.227) 
-3.755 
(2.322) 
93.46 
(61.31) 
N. 37 37 36 
R Squared 0.718 0.728 0.784 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parenthesis 
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* In order to deal with heteroskedasticity and non-equicorrelated errors over time, we use cluster-robust 
covariance estimator as suggested in Schmidheiny (2012) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) 
Column1 shows that weak legal enforcement is positively and significantly related to the 
regional rate of insolvency at 1% statistical significant level. Empirical evidence shows that a 
delayed of 100 days in the legal procedures increases the insolvency rate by about 1.95%. 
Column 2 shows that when we include the variable legal the indicator of prosocial behaviour 
vol is still significant even though the coefficient is slightly lower. In fact the insolvency rate 
decreases by 1.5% with an additional 1% increase in prosocial individuals.  
Column 3 shows that the variables of legal enforcement and of prosocial behaviour keep the 
same relationship with the insolvency rate even when we include economic and financial 
collateral and job stability.  
The empirical analysis does not report the functional form of the interest rate. This is because 
the variable legal does not result significant with respect to interest rate. It seems that the 
decision of the bank to set the interest rate is not affected by the level of legal enforcement.  
 
 
 
 
5. Robustness Analysis: Is It Only a Matter of Punishment?   
 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to address the issue of the robustness of our findings. The 
analysis considers two different issues. Firstly we check whether our empirical findings 
confirm the experimental results of the literature of strong reciprocity and we discuss the 
transmission mechanism of institutional norms provided by the legal enforcement. Secondly, 
we estimate the specified empirical model by using a dynamic two-period panel where we 
take into account serial correlation and potential over-time persistence of the data as 
suggested by Beck and Katz (1996). 
  
 
5.1 Cooperation with and without punishment 
Recalling the experimental results of some evolutionary works, individuals seem to cooperate 
more effectively under punishment condition compared to the case in which punishment is 
absent. One of the most popular lab experiments, in this sense, is the one conducted by Fehr 
and Gachter (2000). The structure of the experiment is a ten round public good game with 
costly punishment and without punishment. They consider three different methods of 
assigning members to groups: personal treatment where the players remain in the same group 
for all the ten rounds; stranger treatment where the players are randomly reassigned after 
each round; perfect stranger treatment where the players are reassigned not randomly but 
such that they will never meet another player more than once (the rounds are reduced to six 
instead of ten). Figure 5 illustrates that, despite strict anonymity, when costly punishment is 
permitted, cooperation does not deteriorate and it almost becomes full cooperation. When 
punishment is not permitted then cooperation falls after a few rounds. 
 
  
Figure 5 Experimental results with and without punishment  
   
Source: Fehr and Gachter (2000) 
 
 
We test whether the estimation framework of this paper can confirm the experimental results. 
We are conscious that there exist differences between lab experiments and empirical “field” 
works. For instance, the lab experiment can minimise the noise caused by contextual factors 
of the “real-world” such as reputation and non-anonymity. These two factors can condition 
the prosocial behaviour of the individuals (Levitt 2007). Other factors such as community 
norms, past experience, continuous repeated inter-personal relationships belong more to the 
“real-world” than to a lab. In other words, the bottom line message is that context matters and 
it cannot be fully controlled by the experimental design (Levitt 2007). For this reason it 
becomes crucial to compare the outcomes of the same theoretical framework achieved 
through different methodological processes. This should contribute to reinforce the findings 
of both of the processes.  
Unlike the lab, in the “real-world” field we cannot create two parallel scenarios such as one 
with punishment (immediate legal enforcement) and one without (complete absence of legal 
enforcement). However, we can consider contexts with different probabilities of getting 
punished. If we limit the range of probabilities into two binary conditions (high probability of 
being punished/strong legal enforcement and low probability of being punished/weak legal 
enforcement) then we get very close to the lab experiment design. To this purpose we 
construct two binary variables of legal enforcement (dlegal1 and dlegal2) from our initial 
variable legal. dlegal1 = 1 indicates the regions whose average time of completing the first 
degree trial is less than the median time and dlegal1 = 0 otherwise. dlega2 = 1 indicates the 
best performing 25% (first quartile) of the regions with the lowest time to complete the first 
degree trial and dlegal2 = 0 otherwise. Considering the median, the line that distinguishes 
regions with weak legal enforcement from regions with strong legal enforcement, dlegal1 = 1 
indicates regions with a relative strong legal enforcement. When we skewed even more the 
proportion toward strong legal enforcement the first quartile distinguishes the regions with a 
relative strong legal enforcement (degal2 =1) from regions with a relative weak legal 
enforcement (dlegal2 = 0). Of course, when we shift the separation line from the median to 
the first quartile we become more demanding in terms of legal enforcement.    
We estimate and we plot predicted probabilities of the impact of prosocial behaviour on 
insolvency for the two different ranges of legal enforcement, dlegal1 and dlegal2 (figure 5). 
Empirical evidence seems to confirm the experimental results at least in three main points. 
Firstly, the downward slopping curves in figure 6.A and 6.B indicate that insolvency rate 
decreases with prosocial behaviour. Secondly, it seems that the cooperative behaviour is 
wider under stronger legal enforcement. This is captured by the shift of the curve to the right 
in both of the cases. Finally, the prosocial behaviour curve is more downward sloppig when 
we consider a even stronger legal enforcement condition. This indicates that the impact of the 
cooperative attitude on breaking the financial promise is even stronger in context with very 
high probabilities of being punished. Overall, as in experimental works, empirical evidence 
indicates that social cooperation is complementary of institutional intervention. Where 
institutional intervention is less uncertain, social cooperation is more effective.      
 
 
Figure 6 Predicted probabilities of prosocial behaviour and legal enforcement for insolvency 
rate  
 
           Figure 6.A dlegal1                                    Figure 6.B dlegal2         
    
 
This complementary effect of prosocial and legal variables should be viewed beyond the 
punishment perspective.   
The legal framework can represent an efficient transmission mechanism of institutional 
norms that can be internalised by the community especially in a medium and long run term. 
One of the shortcomings of the interpretation of the experimental and game theoretical 
outcomes is that cooperative behaviour is mainly explained through the punishment strategy. 
If this view might be plausible in the short run, in the long run this might fail to capture the 
importance of the legal framework as transmission mechanism able to internalise institutional 
norms as “moral imperative”. This recalls the position assumed by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1985) that consider the punishment not only a simple “prize” of an alternative strategy (or 
opportunity cost) but also a symbol that connect the illegal behaviour with the moral 
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dimension. In other words, it indicates what is considered “wrong”. In this sense a more 
efficient legal system is more likely to transmit a stronger sense of law abidance that goes 
beyond the simple punishment-opportunity cost. Orviska and Hudson (2002) provide an 
interesting critical discussion about the distinction between law abidance and civic duty. 
While the former is more related to objective responsibilities define by the law, the latter 
refers to subjective responsibilities within a code of conducts and behaviours. They argue that 
both determine moral attitudes since, if both violated, they can provide an individual with a 
feeling of guilty for having committed a wrong act and for having failed in complying with 
recognised ethical rules (Orviska and Hudson 2002). 
 
5.2 Over-time persistence: Lagged Dependent Variable version of the model  
We conduct a sensitivity analysis through a dynamic two-period panel. We follow Beck and 
Kats (1996) and we take into account serial correlation by including a lagged dependent 
variable LDV among the regressors. This is because we might face over-time persistency in 
the data and the lagged dependent variable might estimate the extent of the persistence in the 
dependent variable
4
. 
 
     
Table 5: estimation framework with the LDV version 
 (1) 
rate 
(2) 
rate 
(3) 
insol 
(4) 
insol 
vol -0502*** 
(0.071) 
-0.386*** 
(0.095) 
-1.310** 
(0.645) 
-1.105* 
(0.594) 
econgive -0.472*** 
(0.136) 
-0.420*** 
(0.145) 
-0.621 
(0.775) 
-0.799 
(0.689) 
lnincome -4.269*** 
(0.415) 
-3.639*** 
(1.018) 
-8.022 
(6.235) 
-2.103 
(5.237) 
deposit -2.813*** 
(0.864) 
-2.518*** 
(0.837) 
-2.986 
(4.198) 
-6.391 
*8.306) 
self 4.944 
(3.402) 
6.202* 
(3.605) 
-48.42* 
(26.17) 
-64.57** 
(32.41) 
rate_1  0.190 
(0.158) 
  
legal   0.0125*** 
(0.004) 
0.0134*** 
(0.004) 
insol_1    0.143 
(0.253) 
constant 50.74*** 
(4.247) 
42.33*** 
(11.54) 
93.46 
(61.31) 
42.30 
(50.58) 
N. 39 38 36 34 
R Squared 0.885 0.892 0.784 0.788 
 * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
                                                          
4
 In the last decade there has been wide debate about the consistency of the suggestions proposed by Beck and 
Katz (1996). This debate is accurately discussed in (Wilson et al. 2007). A criticism is to include a LDV in a 
OLS model as originally suggested by Beck and Katz (1996). This would make the OLS estimators inconsistent. 
We limit this problem because we apply the LDV to a two-period panel and not to an OLS. This different 
structure should not affect inconsistency. On the contrary this will include time-persistent information in our 
original model. The advantage of this procedure is to get closer to our original data than transformed data would 
do (Podesta’ 2006).      
 Table 5 reports the estimates with and without the LDV.   
Table 5 shows that the impact of the control variables of interest (vol, econ_give and legal) 
does not change when we include the lagged dependent variable among the regressors. In 
addition, it seems that the lagged variable does not have any significant impact on the 
dependent variable. It seems that the period of 5 years, which is the time gap between t = 1 
and t = 2 in our model, is long enough to minimise over-time persistency.    
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The hobbesian solution to collective action problems is based on government coercion so that 
every individual is legally constrained to contribute to the public good. However, “the need to 
monitor government is the second-order collective action problems to which government 
coercion cannot be the solution” (Knack 2002, p. 773). In simple words, the missing link in 
Hobbes’ analysis is the positive role of the community. Due to lack of vertical and horizontal 
information government and markets fail in their targets. The empirical findings reported in 
this work indicate that internalised social norms along with institutional legacy can reduce the 
effects of this lack of information. Contexts with more individuals acting prosocially, report 
lower bank interest rates for loans and lower insolvency rates. As in experimental economics, 
our findings show that under more efficient third party enforcement, the compliance toward 
the contract is higher. However, our interpretation goes beyond the simple short run 
opportunity cost approach. A more efficient legal system is more likely to transmit a stronger 
sense of legal abidance that along with prosocial variables determine attitudes of cooperative 
behaviour.     
This might draw attention to at least two important issues. Firstly, Bowels and Gintis (2002) 
define “community governance” as the system of social norms and rules “regulating” the 
behaviour of its members. So “community governance” should be taken into account when 
governments set economic and financial plans. Investing in prosocial activities might become 
a good strategy to reduce market uncertainty. Secondly, following Stiglitz (1990), legal 
reforms should provide lenders with more security for the recovery of their loans. A better 
legal system might represent a positive signal to individuals, leading to an increase in 
cooperative behaviour and a reduction in free-riding problems. 
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 Appendix 
 
Table A1 (Variables) 
 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
Rate Average regional interest rate 
applied for lending to residents 
Bank of Italy 
Insol insolvency / lending Bank of Italy 
Independent Variables Description Source 
Vol Percentage of individuals 
involved in associational 
activities as volunteer. Did you 
provide help as a volunteer? 
ISTAT 
econgive Percentage of individuals that 
have provided economic helps to 
family and friends during periods 
of economic difficulties 
ISTAT 
deposit Deposit / Value Added ISTAT 
lnincome Natural log of income per capita Eurostat 
self independent workers / total 
workers 
ISTAT 
legal Regional average length of time 
(in terms of days) to complete a 
first degree trial by the courts. 
ISTAT 
dlegal1 dlegal1 = 1 regions whose 
average time to complete the first 
degree trial is above the median 
time  
dlegal1 = 0 otherwise  
Author re-elaboration from 
the variable legal (ISTAT) 
dlegal2 dlegal2 = 1 regions of the first 
quartile with respect to the 
average length of time to 
complete a first degree trial by 
courts 
dlegal2 = 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
